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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA SMITH,
Case No. 930162-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Priority No. 15

RICHARD RAYMOND SMITH, SR.,
Defendant/Appellant

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPELLEE'S BRIEF
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5
Utah Code Annotated §78-32-1
ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE HOME IN CEDAR CITY, HAD
BEEN "COMMINGLED" INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
The initial sentence in Appellee's "Statement of the
Case" has no relevance to the issues briefed and presented to the
Court for review and misstates the evidence.

Defendant therefore

objects to that claim. Although Plaintiff had signed an affidavit,
in an attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order, in which she
claimed that the Defendant had apparently "pinned" her to the wall
and "knocked" her to the ground in a violent display of anger, when
she testified about that incident at trial, she said that, in the

course of an argument about whether she and Defendant should go to
dinner or not he came toward her, and as she backed up she hit her
head on a wall and fell down on her tailbone. 1(T. at 234-235).
Characterizing

that

incident

as

"violent... spousal

abuse" is

misleading at best.
The Appellee's Statement of Facts as it relates to the
Court's

decision

regarding

distribution

of property

includes

statements for which there is no evidentiary support.

Appellee

claims that she had a "prior home... in Agua Dulce, California,"
and it is true that the trial court made that finding (T. at 750751).

However, prior to the parties' marriage Plaintiff did not

have a home; she was the beneficiary of two trust deeds secured by
a home (T. at 341) and only realized the benefit of that asset
after considerable time and effort were spent during the marriage.
(T. at 369-370)

In addition, Plaintiff did not testify that the

proceeds from the sale of Defendant's home were commingled.

She

"believed" that the money to purchase the home came from the
parties' joint account (T. at 71). However, on cross examination
Plaintiff freely admitted that she did not know where the funds
came^from to make the down payment on the home in Cedar City (T. at
345-346) .
The home in Cedar City, Utah, was purchased with the
proceeds from the sale of Defendant's premarital home (T. at 518519),

in which

Plaintiff

had

no interest

(T. at

399), and

Throughout the brief the literal "R" will stand for Record of
the case and the literal "T" will stand for the transcript of the
trial. The numbers following the literals will indicate the page
where the material referenced can be located.

Defendant's premarital retirement account. (T. at 396, 601-602)
That* asset

cannot

be

equated

with

Plaintiff's

interest

as

beneficiary of two trust deeds on the home in Aqua Dulce, where the
value of that asset was preserved and enhanced as a direct result
of Defendant's efforts during the marriage, (T. at 583-586).

Such

a simplistic view of the assets of this marriage ignores decisions
of this Court relating to treatment of premarital property and
inequitably awards to the Plaintiff a windfall by giving her an
interest in Defendant's premarital asset for no other reason than
that she lived in and enjoyed the use of that asset during the
marriage.
Although the trial court did find that "the assets,"
apparently referring to the proceeds of the sale of Defendant's
home and sale of the home which was security for the Plaintiff's
two trust deeds, "were commingled"

(T. at 751), there was no

credible evidence on which the trial court could base that finding.
The proceeds from the sale of Defendant's home can be directly
traced into the down payment for purchase of the home in Cedar City
both with reference to the amount of the down payment (T. at 518)
and the date the home was purchased. Defendant sold his home on
June 9th, received the check on June 13th (T. at 518) and purchased
the home in Cedar City on June 20, 1988. (T. at 39)
B.

ALTHOUGH THE MARITAL ESTATE MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE

JAGU&R AUTOMOBILE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN

IT FAILED TO

ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DEFENDANT ALSO HAS A PREMARITAL INTEREST IN THAT
ASSET.
3

Defendant had a separate property interest in the Jaguar
automobile.

Testimony

with

reference

to

a

1984

Corvette

established that it had been purchased by the Defendant and driven
back and forth by him from Burbank, California to Cedar City, Utah.
(T. at 559)

That automobile had been purchased with $6,000.00

whicfr the Defendant had saved from the proceeds of his premarital
retirement account. That asset in which Defendant had a premarital
interest, was sold and the funds were applied toward purchase of
the 1988 Jaguar automobile.

(T. at 559-560).

The trial court had

no contrary evidence before it with reference to the source of the
funds with

which

the

1988

Jaguar

automobile

was purchased.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
acknowledge a premarital interest in that asset at least with
reference to use of the proceeds from the sale of the 1984
Corvette.
In light of Defendant's claim that the home in Cedar City
is his premarital property, he also maintains that the debts
associated with

that asset are his personal debts as well.

Approximately half of the purchase price for the Jaguar automobile
was acquired with a loan secured by the Defendant's home in Cedar
City, (T. at 554, 557) and approximately that same amount remains
outstanding (T. at 560).

This is approximately one-half of the

purchase price of the vehicle (T. at 560). The trial court could
and should have recognized Defendant's premarital interest in the
asset by awarding Defendant either his premarital contribution or
at

least

a

percentage

of

the
4

sale

proceeds

based

on

the

relationship of premarital assets used to purchase the automobile
to the total purchase price.

The trial court erred when it did

neither, ignoring Defendant's separate property interest.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE A

MARITAL INTEREST IN THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMARITAL PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE.
While it is true that there was testimony presented at
trial that Defendant had been reimbursed from the proceeds of the
sale of the Aqua Dulce home for expenses to renovate Plaintiff's
Porsche automobile,

(T. at 670) those funds, according to the

findings of the trial court, were not "premarital funds."

The

trial court correctly found that the proceeds of the sale of the
Aqua Dulce home were marital funds (T. at 750-751).

Accordingly,

the funds used to reimburse the Defendant for improvements to the
Plaintiff's premarital automobile were paid for with marital funds.
The marital estate has an interest in that automobile what the
trial court should have recognized and awarded to Plaintiff with an
award of other marital assets of equal value to Defendant.
D.

THE LAW OF THE STATE IN WHICH AN ASSET IS, AND THROUGHOUT

THE ENTIRE MARRIAGE, HAS BEEN LOCATED, GOVERNS DISPOSITION OF THAT
ASSET EVEN WHEN A COURT IN THIS STATE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER AND PARTIES IN THE DIVORCE.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in a
lawsuit

does

not

require

resolution of the dispute.

that

the

law

of

the

forum

govern

In Forsman v. Forsman 779 P.2d 218

(Utah 1989) a California couple filed a lawsuit in Utah which would
have been barred under Utah's doctrine of interspousal immunity.
5

However, the Supreme Court determined that California law, which
does not recognize the doctrine of interspousal immunity for a
negligent tort, should have been applied although the lawsuit was
pending in this state.
Where the law of the situs of an asset is in conflict with
Utah law, the trial court must determine which state's law to
apply.
The

401K

Salaried

Savings

plan

is

located,

as is

Defendant's employment, solely in the state of California. Section
6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides, as a
general guide to choice of law selection, that the following
factors, insofar as they may be relevant to the analysis, should be
considered: (a) The needs of the interstate and international
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified
underlying

the

expectations, (e) the basic policies

particular

field

of

law,

(f)

certainty,

predictability and uniformity of results, and (g) ease in the
determination of and application of the law to be applied.
Although the policy of this state that assets be valued
at the time of the divorce may appear, at first blush, to suggest
that Utah law be applied to this matter, competing policies mandate
that California law be followed when coupled with the apparent
policy of the state of California that acknowledges a separate
property interest in post separation earnings (See California Civil
6

Code §5118),

the certainty, predictability

and uniformity of

results inherent in application of a California law which allows
each party to keep his or her earnings following separation, and
the ease in determining and applying the California law to this
controversy.
In this case Defendant tried to obtain a trial setting in
this matter by requesting a Scheduling Conference and Trial Setting
on August 13, 1992 (R. at 63-64).
1992,

The trial, set for October 30,

was subsequently continued, consistent with Plaintiff's

motion filed on or about August 24th (R. at 96-97).
trial was held in December.

Ultimately

Following the parties' separation,

Defendant paid temporary alimony, Plaintiff diverted marital funds
to her own use despite a court order prohibiting her from doing so
(See page 34 of Appellant's Brief), Defendant contributed his post
separation earnings to increase the value of his 401K Salaried
Savings plan and Defendant was actively seeking to obtain a final
resolution of the matter.

There is public policy in favor of

recognizing Defendant's post separation earnings as his separate
property under those circumstances.
Utah has no "significant relationship" to the California
401K Salaried Savings plan. This is especially so where, as here,
following the parties' separation, the Defendant was denied access
to his home in the state of Utah and has resided in the state of
California, earning income and contributing additional funds toward
his 401K Salaried Savings Plan in that state.
E." THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
7

PLAINTIFF TO RETAIN MARITAL FUNDS WITHDRAWN FROM THE PARTIES' JOINT
BUSINESS AND THEREBY PROFIT FROM HER VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER,
ESPECIALLY WHILE DEFENDANT WAS PAYING HER THE ALIMONY THAT HAD BEEN
ORDERED.
Regardless of whether Plaintiff was successful in her efforts
to manage the parties' jointly owned business, the Sportsmen's
Lounge, her conduct in withdrawing funds from income generated by
that business violated the law of this case.

The Domestic

Commissioner had ordered that she not withdraw funds from the
Lounge (R at 42).

The rulings of the Domestic Commissioner are

binding upon the parties until modified by the District Court Judge
(Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-402(4)). There is no
justification

in the

record

for

the

trial

Plaintiff's blatantly contemptuous conduct.

court

to

excuse

She should have been

ordered to account to the marital estate for her illegal diversion
of marital funds by repaying those funds to the marital estate.
F. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO IGNORE DAMAGE TO DEFENDANT'S
FIREARMS WHICH OCCURRED WHILE THE PLAINTIFF HAD THOSE ITEMS IN HER
CARE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In response to Defendant's argument that the trial court
abused its discretion by not awarding him compensation for damage
to his firearms while in the Plaintiff's possession and care,
Plaintiff argues that "there was no independent evidence that
damage resulted from the use" by Plaintiff's son.

Plaintiff then

suggests that the Court's decision was reached after it "weighed
the

credibility"

of the witnesses.
8

In order to weigh the

credibility of witnesses, there ought to at least be contrary
evidence presented.

Here there was none.

Plaintiff's son. (T. at 268).

The guns were used by

The guns were damaged while they

were in Plaintiff's possession (T. at 645).

The trial court's

failure to make any award to the Appellant to compensate him for
damage to those firearms ignored the evidence and was an abuse of
the trial court's discretion.
G. CHILD SUPPORT ACCRUED DURING THE MARRIAGE IS AN ASSET THAT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Following

termination

of

these

parties'

marriage,

Plaintiff, in addition to other assets awarded her, has the right
to collect approximately $64,250.00 in delinquent child support
from her exhusband. The trial court totally ignored that asset,
failing even to address what value it may have.
trial court abused its discretion.
status of a child

In doing so the

In light of the preferred

support debt the trial court should have

determined the value of that asset to the marital estate and should
have awarded that asset to the Plaintiff.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE PRESEPARATION TRAVEL

EXPENSE AND ITS FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT FOR HIS RETAINING
A PORTION OF THE INCOME TAX REFUND UNTIL THE COURT HAD RULED ON THE
STATUS OF THAT DEBT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
At

the

time

these

parties

separated

there

was an

outstanding credit card debt of $4,882.35 for travel expenses
associated with the Defendant's commute between California and
Cedar City, Utah.

That debt had been historically paid as a debt
9

of the marital business. (T. at 592-593)

The Defendant had been

ordered to use the income tax refund to pay business debts.
paid certain of those debts.

He

However, he retained the balance of

the income tax refund and did not pay any specific business debt
because there was a dispute pending regarding the status of the
credit card debt (T. at 594). Until the trial court had resolved
that dispute and acknowledged that obligation as a business debt
Defendant did not know what he was required to do.

In order to be

held in contempt a party must know what the court has ordered him
to do, have the ability to comply, and then fail to comply. UCA
§78-32-1, Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).

In this

case, although Defendant asked for a ruling on that issue (T. at
719) the trial court did not address the debt in its initial
findings, and only entered findings and an order relating to that
credit card debt after Defendant had filed a Motion to Supplement
Findings and Order.

(R. at 283-187, 406-411)

The Defendant

understood that he was to use the funds to pay debts of the
business, without any debt having been specifically specified. His
waiting until an issue with regard to the status of a specific debt
had been resolved is not contemptuous.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings and legal conclusions regarding
those issues presented in Appellant's brief are not supported by
the law or the facts. The trial court's ruling should be reversed
and the relief reguested in Appellant's Brief on Appeal granted.
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY

Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in Cross-Appellant's Brief are
as foliows:
1.

Is the trial court required to award alimony if the party-

requesting the same is capable of providing for his or her own
needs and will receive substantial assets pursuant to the trial
court's division of marital property, just because his or her exspouse earns substantially more income than she or he does, where
the parties' respective abilities to generate earned income has
essentially remained the same during the parties' seven year
marriage.

As to the Court's factual finding concerning the

Plaintiff's needs and ability to support herself, the "clearly
erroneous" standard should apply.
481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).

Hagan v. Haqan, 810 P. 2d 478,

As to the court' decision to award no

alimony based on those factual findings, the "clear abuse of
discretion" standard of review should apply.

Kerr v. Kerr, 610

P,2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).
2.

Is the trial court required to award attorney's fees in a

divorce proceeding just because there is a disparity in the
11

parties' respective abilities to earn income despite the fact that
the party requesting attorney's fees has been awarded substantial
assets from which those attorney's fees could be paid.

As to the

Court's factual finding concerning the Plaintiff's financial need,
the "clearly erroneous" standard should apply. Haqan v. Hagan, 810
P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).

As to the court' decision to

award no attorney's fees based on those factual findings, the
"clear abuse of discretion" standard of review should apply. Kerr
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cross-Appellee incorporates herein by reference the statement
of the case as set forth in Appellant's Brief, on file herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cross-Appellee incorporates herein by reference the statement
of facts as set forth in Appellant's Brief, on file herein,
together with the following:
1.

At trial, Plaintiff testified that her net monthly

living expenses, excluding housing, and including the living
expenses for her minor son, totalled $675.00 per month (T. at 202).
The trial court found that Plaintiff needs $605.00 per month to
satisfy her financial needs plus housing costs (R. at 360) as
claimed in her Financial Declaration (T. at 759).
2.
approximately

Plaintiff

will

be

responsible

to

pay

the

$450.00 per month mortgage on the home she is
12

occupying until it sells. (R. at 360)
3.

Plaintiff has earned income, until the Sportsmen's

Lounge sells, of $1,150.00 per month (R. at 361, T. at 760) which
is what she had been earning at the time of trial (T. at 192, 362)
from the Lounge and her part time work at Wendys.
4. Prior to her marriage to Defendant, Plaintiff was
employed, earning $6.00 per hour. (T. at 205)
5.

Defendant obtained his current employment prior to

the marriage to Plaintiff. (T. at 482)
6. After the Sportsmen's Lounge is sold, Plaintiff will
be capable of earning $800-$900 per month gross income (R. at 361)
and will receive substantial cash upon sale of the assets the Court
ordered sold (R. at 361), of approximately $95,000.00, if she
receives half the equity realized upon sale of the home in Cedar
City (R. at 361), plus other assets, including almost half of
Defendant's 401K Salaried Savings plan. (R. at 371)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In determining whether an award of alimony is appropriate, the
trial court is required to consider three factors. The trial court
did so in this case and correctly determined that, regardless of
whether

the Defendant

had the ability

to pay

some support,

Plaintiff had no need for alimony from the Defendant. Her ability
to produce income, both prior to and following sale of the marital
business, a sale which would net payment of a substantial sum to
Plaintiff, is sufficient to meet her needs.

Especially in a

marriage of relatively short duration—seven years—where neither
13

parties' earning ability has substantially changed, the trial
court's decision was correct. To rule otherwise would, in essence,
grant a windfall to one who, in middle age, enters into a second
marriage with someone who, at the time of that second marriage,
already had a substantially greater earning ability.

Where, as

here, the Plaintiff still has the ability to support herself at the
termination of this second marriage, of relatively short duration,
it is not at all inappropriate for the court to place the parties
in essentially the same position to support him or herself as each
was in at the time the marriage began.
In determining

whether

an

award

of

attorney's

fees is

appropriate, the court is not required to focus its attention
exclusively on the earning ability of the parties.

In this case,

the trial court correctly determined that, in light of all of the
circumstances, including the property awarded to each party, the
Plaintiff did not need financial assistance from the Defendant to
pay her attorney's fees.

It was not necessary for the trial court

to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees for which
assistance in payment was not necessary.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO

NEED FOR ALIMONY AND THEREFORE APPROPRIATELY DECLINED PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF THE SAME.
Throughout her brief on this issue, Plaintiff cites several
cases in support of what she identifies as the "Jones test". The
trial court is required to consider the following three factors in
14

awarding alimony:

"(1) The financial conditions and needs of the

receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the
ability of the responding spouse to provide support."

Watson v.

Watson/ 837 P.2d 1,3 (Ut. App. 1992), Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1075 (Ut. 1985).

Despite acknowledging those three factors,

Plaintiff focuses her entire argument on the third factor and
appears to suggest that, regardless of the needs of the requesting
spouse or her ability to produce sufficient income for herself, the
Court should award alimony if there is a disparity in the parties'
earning abilities. That argument is clearly contrary to the law of
this state as it relates to the issue of alimony.
In this case the trial court properly determined, based
on the evidence presented, that the Plaintiff

has a monthly

financial need of approximately $1,055.00 (T. at 759).

At the

present time, with the earnings Plaintiff generates from the
parties' joint business, she is earning approximately $1,150.00.
That exceeds her monthly need.

(T. at 760).

When the Sportsmen's Lounge, the parties' joint business,
is sold the Plaintiff will receive substantial assets.

She will

receive at least one half of the equity in the Sportsmen's Lounge
(R at 368-369) and may receive more in the event the Defendant
elects

to

trade

his

equity

in

the

Sportsmen's

Lounge

Plaintiff's claim to his retirement benefit. (R. at 371).

for
In

addition to the substantial funds Plaintiff will have upon sale of
the Sportsmen's Lounge, she will still have the ability to produce
15

income of $800-$900 per month even if she is not able to take
advantage of skills she acquired while managing the Sportsmen's
Lounge.

That amount will at least meet her needs in light of one

additional factor: Her "needs" as testified to at trial include
some living expenses for her then minor son.

He has now reached

the age of majority, thereby relieving Plaintiff of the legal
responsibility for his support.
In this case, the trial court adopted as its finding the
Plaintiff's statement concerning her financial needs as set forth
in her financial declaration (T. at 759). The trial court properly
found that Plaintiff was capable of meeting those needs with her
own resources and through her own employment efforts. (T at 759762):

Therefore, the cases cited by Plaintiff in which the

requesting spouse's needs exceeded her income, including Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) and Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d
489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), have no application to this case, except
insofar as they reaffirm the rule that all three factors must be
considered by the trial court before awarding alimony.
The trial court's findings on the issue of alimony are
adequately supported by the record.
Plaintiff points out that women generally earn less than
men do and that men experience an improvement in their post divorce
standard of living while women experience a decline.
Appellant's Brief at 39-40)

(Cross

However, Plaintiff fails to cite any

studies to suggest to what extent those statistics may be affected
by

short

term

marriages

which
16

do

not

affect

the

wife's

employability, or in which the wife has not invested "her resources
jointly in the husband's 'human capital'."
In this

case, the

Plaintiff

clearly

experienced

a

substantial increase in her standard of living when she married the
Defendant. At that time she was earning $6.00 per hour (T. at 205)
and the Defendant was employed as an engineer at Lockheed. (T. at
482)

To suggest that the Plaintiff's standard of- living, for

purposes of an alimony award, should be measured exclusively by her
spouse's income, especially where he has maintained the same job
throughout the parties' marriage and the marriage was of relatively
short duration, suggests an approach to spousal support which, in
essence, would encourage a person who has married into favorable
circumstances to enter into and then terminate that marriage in
crder to enjoy the benefit of the other spouses already established
earning ability. Marriage is not an institution and divorce is not
a procedure by which one party is entitled to a windfall.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT, TAKING INTO

CONSIDERATION THE ASSETS AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, SHE HAS THE ABILITY
TO PAY HER OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES.
As this Court pointed out in Muir v. Muir/ 831 P.2d 736
(Utah App. 1992) the initial

inquiry

in determining whether

attorney's fees should be awarded is whether the party seeking
reimbursement for attorney's fees has the financial need for
assistance in paying his or her fees and whether the other party
has the ability to pay those fees.

If the Court finds need and the

ability to pay then the Court should move to the next level of
17

inquiry, that is, whether the fees requested are reasonable.

In

this case the trial court properly found that, in light of other
assets awarded to the Plaintiff, she had the ability to pay her own
attorney's fees. Plaintiff has failed to marshall the evidence in
support of the Court's ruling in that regard to demonstrate that
the evidence does not support the trial court's finding and appears
to base her entire argument in this regard on the disparity in the
parties' earning ability. The trial court is not required to focus
its attention exclusively on the parties' earning abilities.
this, case, the trial court properly

considered

In

all factors,

including property awarded to the Plaintiff, and appropriately
declined to award attorney's fees in light of the Plaintiff's
ability to pay her own fees from assets awarded her.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision with regard to the issue of alimony
and

attorney's

fees

is properly

supported

by

the evidence.

Plaintiff's argument that the trial court should have focused its
iaquiry on the disparity in the parties' earning abilities has no
support in the law of this jurisdiction or in the record.
trial

court's denial of Plaintiff's

attorney's fees should he affirmed.
DATED this

l^l

day of

request

The

for alimony and

x?^
(jS^Y

, 1993.

GALLIAN, WES/FALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT

G. Michael Westfall
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